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11 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe case. 
Alan Golub (Golub) obtained a default judgment against Geraldine Kirk-Hughes 
(Kirk-Hughes), Kirk-Hughes Development (KHD), and Kirk-Hughes & Associates in 2009 
(eollectively the Kirk-Hughes defendants). He properly undertook colleetion efforts which were 
impeded by KHD's two bankruptcies, which were dismissed. He was further impeded by a claim 
that another entity, Kirk-Scott, LLC (a company owned in large part by Kirk-Hughes' sister, 
Balinda Antoine), claimed a deed of trust on the real property owned by KHD, which was 
superior to the Golubs' judgment lien; that deed was purportedly given in 2004 and recorded in 
violation of the bankruptcy stay in 2010. Golub brought an action for declaratory relief to 
establish his judgment priority against Kirk-Scott, and the trial court granted summary judgment 
establishing Golub's priority. That action was consolidated with this action, in which the 
Kirk-Hughes defendants join Kirk-Seott to assert that the trial eourt erred in ruling that the 
Golubs' judgment had priority, and in awarding sanctions. 
B. Statement of facts. 
Originally, Alan Golub commeneed suit against KHD, Geraldine Kirk-Hughes, and 
Kirk-Hughes & Associates, as well as other defendants including Kelly Polatis and the 
Petersons, because instead of paying a real estate eommission owed for proeuring a sale of 
property owned by the Petersons, the various parties tortiously manipulated sales of the property 
to avoid the real estate commission. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 162-169) After defending the case for a year 
and a half~ the Kirk-Hughes defendants defaulted, and Mr. Golub obtained a judgment against 
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them in the amount of $941,000 on March 11, 2009. (R. Vol. f, pp. 35-37) KHD filed for 
bankruptcy on April 6, 2009 in Nevada. (R. Vol. 1, p. 79) While that bankruptcy was pending, 
Kirk-Scott LLC recorded a Deed of Trust on the property owned by KHD; the Deed of trust was 
purportedly given in 2004. (Augmented Record, lvlay 3, 20f3 Afl of/vlichael T Howard, E,\:. 5) 
Kirk-Scott is a company owned by Geraldine Kirk-Hughes' sister, Balinda Antoine. Kirk-Scott 
is a 51.5% member of KHD; Antoine is a 3% member. (Augmented Record, May 3, 20f 3 Ail (~l 
Michael T Howard, E'(. 10, p. 23) On October 28,2010, KIlD's bankruptcy was dismissed, and 
having resolved the remaining claims against the remaining defendant, Peterson, Golub re-
recorded his judgment. (R. Vol. L p. 35) 
C. Course of proceedings. 
When Golub thereafter learned that Kirk-Scott had recorded a Deed of Trust against the 
properties, he filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the priority of his judgment lien 
against all persons claiming interest, which included Kirk-Scott, the IRS. and the Kirk-Hughes 
Defendants. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 28-32) Golub moved for summary judgment to establish that his 
judgment lien was prior to the improperly recorded Kirk-Scott Deed of Trust, which was 
allegedly given in 2004, but not recorded until September 2010. (R. Vol. f, pp. 67-97) 
The trial court granted Mr. Golub's motion for summary judgment, finding his judgment 
lien to be valid and prior to the Kirk-Scott unrecorded Deed of trust. (R. Vol. L pp. 414-421) 
The trial court also awarded sanctions against both Kirk-Scott and the Kirk-Hughes Defendants 
for improperly bringing a motion to amend judgment unde; Rule 59. Kirk-Scott appealed on a 
variety of issues; the remaining Kirk-Hughes Defendants also appealed, but limited this appeal to 
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two issues: 1) that the district court erred beeause Mr. Golub had knowledge of the Kirk-Scott 
deed of trust, which precluded his priority under the good faith requirement of Idaho Code 
§55-606; and 2) that the trial court erred in awarding sanctions against the Kirk-Hughes 
defendants because while they had joined in an improper motion, they had not filed additional 
briefing. The Kirk-Hughes Defendants misstate both the law and the facts relevant to the priority 
issue, and the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions, so no basis for reversal 
exists. 
ARGUMENT 
The Kirk-Hughes defendants' argument regarding Golub's "knowledge" of the year 
old deed of trust misapplies the relevant law; Golub was not a purchaser and so his good faith 
knowledge is wholly irrelevant to the priority of his judgment lien. Even so, the Kirk-Hughes 
defendants also mischaracterize the facts to assert Golub had actual knowledge of the deed; 
proper analysis of the. testimony establishes his lack of actual knowledge, and the Kirk-Hughes 
defendants concede the defective and void 2010 recordation could not have provided 
constructive notice. 
Moreover, while the Kirk-Hughes defendants did not file additional briefing on the 
motion to amend, it is undisputed they joined the motion in violation of I.R.c.P. Il(a). As a 
result, the court did not err in ordering the Kirk-Hughes defendants to share in the order on 
sanctions. 
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A. Idaho's priority statute does not impose the obligation on a judgment debtor to 
exercise bona fide purchaser "good faith" to establish its priority. 
The Kirk-Hughes defendants assert that the trial court should have found that Golub's 
judgment lien is inferior to Kirk-Scott's Deed of Trust under I.C. §55-606 because the trial court 
failed to find that Golubs exercised "good faith"; this is a misapplication of the requirement of 
the priority statute. That requirement applies to purchasers or encumbrancers, and not to 
judgment liens. 
Idaho Code §55-606 governs the treatment of a judgment lien in determining priority of 
interests in real property and provides: 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive against the 
grantor, also against everyone subsequently claiming under him, except a 
purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, 
acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly 
recorded. (Emphasis added) 
I.e. §55-606. 
The Kirk-Hughes defendants' position rests upon an interpretation of I.e. §55-606 that 
conditions the priority of a judgment lien upon good faith. I Courts interpreting a statute are to 
give effect to legislative intent. See Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 
951 (2003). The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. 
Statev. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007). The plain meaning of a statute 
therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain 
I The Kirk-Hughes defendants do not also address the requirement "for valuable consideration" which is addressed 
in the Kirk-Scott appeal. Presumably, that requirement is ignored here because it underscores the lack of logical 
application ofthe statute to a judgment lien. 
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meaning leads to absurd results. 1d. If the language of the statute is capable of more than one 
reasonable construction it is ambiguous. An ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what 
the legislature intended it 10 mean. 1d. To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not 
only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the 
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. 1d. 
By its plain terms, I.C. §55-606 does not condition the priority of a judgment lien upon 
food faith or the giving of additional consideration. When read as a whole, the statute provides 
protection for two classes of interest holders: (1) a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good 
faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument; or (2) a valid 
judgment lien. In appropriate statutory interpretation, the word "or" indicates alternative things; 
in a statute should be given its usual disjunctive meaning. State v. Rivera, 131 Idaho 8, 10, 951 
P.2d 528(Ct. App. 1998). These clauses here must be read disjunctively, because use of the 
word "lien" more than once would be redundant and superfluous if the statute were not intended 
to distinguish a valid judgment lien from a lien by any another instrument taken in good faith for 
consideration. 
A review of the legislative history behind the 1989 amendment to the statute supports this 
reading. Prior to 1989, the statute did not include reference to judgment liens. In 1989, the 
legislature amended the statute by including the single phrase "or valid judgment lien." 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 3..f6) The stated purpose of the amendment provides: 
This legislation would provide that a valid judgment lien that is first duly 
recorded has priority over subsequently recorded grants or conveyances of an 
estate in real property. 
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(R. Vol J, p. 347) 
The minutes of the Judiciary and Rules Committee further provide: 
Senator Crapo presented this legislation and stated that it clarifies the effect of a 
valid judgment lien regarding a grant or conveyance of an estate in real property. 
The Supreme Court has recently allowed a judgment to be eliminated if the 
property is sold before collection can be made. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 347) 
Reading the statute to require a judgment lienholder to exercise good faith or produce 
additional consideration is somewhat of a square peg in a round hole, and leads to an absurd 
result. The necessity of good faith and consideration serves the purpose of protecting the 
purchaser: a purchaser must exercise good faith to determine whether any prior interests exist on 
the property so that he knows what he is purchasing. The failure the possessor of an interest in 
property to provide would-be purchasers with notice of that prior interest necessarily may not use 
the failure to disclose to their advantage. This principle is based upon the notion of a bargained 
for exchange to allow the purchaser of an interest in land to know what he or she is buying. 
A lien by judgment is wholly different. A judgment line is not bartered for or exchanged 
for value; the holder obtains its interest as a matter of a statutory lien granted to judgment 
creditors. See I.e. § 1 0-11lO. It exists as a matter of law, and not in an exercise of reaching a 
deal with the record owner or others. The judgment creditor cannot protect itself by choosing 
not to have been injured by the property owner, which give it its lien rights. There is no 
additional consideration necessary to give rise to the rights, nor is there any notice or knowledge 
of other superseding interest that impacts its rights: it simply is. 
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A judgment holder has no such ability or requirement. It obtains its interest as a matter of 
a statutory lien granted to judgment creditors. I.e. § 1 0-111 O. It exists as a matter of law, and 
not in an exercise of reaching a deal with the record owner or others, as by giving consideration. 
The judgment lien holder's knowledge of other interests is irrelevant to its lien. Recordation is 
the only requisite to secure its priority. 
Accordingly, neither the text of I.e. §55-606 nor the courts interpreting it require that any 
finding of good faith or additional consideration, beyond the underlying obligation giving rise to 
the judgment, is necessary for the holder of a valid judgment lien to avail himself to the 
protections of I.e. §55-606. The Kirk-Hughes defendants' argument underscores the absurdity 
that such a read of the statute would result in, and the trial court properly awarded Golub priority 
as a judgment lienholder without such findings. 
B. No disputed issues of fact establish Mr. Golub's actual knowledge of Kirk-Scott's 
deed of trust. 
Even were Golub required to establish his good faith, the undisputed facts establish that 
he had no actual knowledge of the Kirk-Scott deed of trust. Put very simply, the Kirk-Hughes 
Defendants specify four pieces of evidence that they assert create an issue of fact, or establish 
Mr. Golub's knowledge regarding the Kirk-Scott deed of trust before he re-recorded his 
judgment in October 2009. In each instance, the evidence does not raise an issue of fact 
sufficient to defeat summary judgment, or reverse the trial court opinion. 
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The Kirk-Hughes Defendants first incorrectly assert that Golub testified he \vas aware of 
the deed of trust when Kirk-Scott recorded it on September 17, 2010. Mr. Golub's affidavit 
actually stated: 
14. was not a\vare that Kirk-Scott had executed a deed of trust to Kirk-
Hughes Development prior to Kirk-Scott recording one during Kirk-Hughes 
Development's bankruptcy on September 17,2010. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 96) Golub was testifying only as to his knowledge prior to September 7. 2010. His 
affidavit is silent regarding his knowledge on or after September 17, 2010, and the Kirk-Hughes 
defendants simply restate the above "conversely" to reach the conclusion that Golub he 
became aware on that date. This is not what the affidavit says, and the Kirk-Hughes defendants 
cannot restate someone's testimony to create alleged inconsistencies. 
Silence on an issue does not create a disputed fact, particularly when Golub testified 
directly on the issue in his deposition: 
Q. All right. Prior to 2013 when you were first handed a physical copy of the 
November 18, 2004 Kirk-Scott deed of trust, did you have any idea that 
Kirk-Scott claimed an interest in the properties? 
A. I did not know of any claim of interest in the properties or this deed of 
trust. No, I did not. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 99) 
Thus, the statements in the Atlidavit of Golub identify a period in which he was unaware 
of the Deed of Trust, but do not identify that he had actual knowledge of the filing. lIe simply 
did not opine in his Affidavit that he was aware as of September 17, 2010, and his subsequent 
deposition testimony, during which KHD could have questioned him on the Aflldavit, clearly 
establishes that he did not know of the Deed of Trust until it was physically shown to him in 
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2013. The Kirk-Hughes Defendants' attempt to utilize a specific interpretation, or 
misinterpretation, of Golub's one line sentence does not create an inconsistency with his actual 
testimony on when he became aware of the September 17, 2010 fIling. Trying to read disputed 
facts into the two statements are necessary for the Kirk-Hughes Defendants, because there 
simply is no evidence of Golub's actual knowledge of that filing. 
The Kirk-Hughes Defendants' liberal recitation of the facts in the record is underscored 
by the other two pieces of testimony on which the Kirk-Hughes Defendants rely to establish that 
Mr. Golub was aware of Kirk-Scott's deed of trust. First, the Kirk-Hughes Defendants assert that 
"Darlene Moore testified that... she personally informed Mr. Golub that Kirk-Scott had an 
interest in the Sloan property." Darlene Moore's testimony was instead: 
Affidavit of Darlene Moore 
In November of 2004 .. .1 advised Alan that it was my belief that Ms. Kirk-Hughes was 
still interested in the property and still interested in pursuing the development because 
she had just recently created a corporation called Kirk-Hughes Development and had 
asked me to prepare a Note and Deed of Trust in favor of her sister, Balinda 
Antoine, to exchange for the title to the Sloan property that had been purchased in Kirk-
Scott, Ltd. name. Alan had proposed that Ms. Kirk-Hughes use the Sloan parcel to 
acquire tinancing to assist Ms. Kirk-Hughes in purchasing the Peterson property. I told 
them this was not possible as I had already prepared the mortgage in favor of 
Balinda. 
(R. Vol. 1. pp. 306-3(7) (emphasis added) 
In 2006 ... 3) I reminded Alan that Balinda Antoine had a mortgage on the Sloan parcel 
so there would be no asset to collect against. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 307-3(8) 
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Ms. Moore's Atlidavit only purports to establish that she informed Golub that she 
prepared some instrument, but provides no testimony that Golub had knowledge that an 
instrument encumbering the property was actually executed. Moreover, Moore's Affidavit is 
unclear as to whether she informed Golub that she prepared a Deed of Trust or a mortgage.2 
Clearly, if she informed Golub that she had prepared a mortgage, it cannot be said that he had 
knowledge of a Deed of Trust. 
What is clear from Ms. Moore's Atlidavit is that whatever encumbrance was intended, 
she informed Golub that it related solely to the Sloan property3 and was in favor of Balinda 
Antoine: not Kirk-Scott, Ltd.4 
Next, the Kirk-Hughes Defendants state that "Geraldine Kirk-Hughes testified that she 
also informed Mr. Golub that a deed of trust was granted to Kirk-Scott." In reality, 
Ms. KIrk-Hughes' testimony was: 
Affidavit of Geraldine Kirk-Hughes 
In September 2004 .. .1 told Mr. Golub that I was forming a separate entity to develop the 
land, and that title to all the properties would be transferred to the new company. I 
specifically told Mr. Golub that I was giving my sister a mortgage or deed of trust to 
secure Kirk-Scott, Ltd.'s interest. (Emphasis added) 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 313) 
2 Deeds of Trust differ from Mortgages in that deeds of trust always involve at least three parties, where the third 
party holds the legal title, while in the context of mortgages. the mortgagor gives legal title directly to the 
mortgagee. 
3 The November 18, 2004 Deed of Trust identities only two of the three Sloan parcels, and includes the Atkinson 
parcel. (R. Vol. I, pp. 39-·10) 
4 Ms. Moore's Affidavit provides no foundation to establish she has personal knowledge of a mortgage executed in 
favor of Balinda Antoine. 
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In November of 2004, your af1iant requested Darlene Moore to prepare a Note and Deed 
of Trust in favor of Kirk-Scott Ltd. to cover the monies spent by Balinda Antoine to 
acquire the Sloan parcel. Your af1iant specifically informed Alan of this .... 
CR. Vol. I, pp. 315-316) 
After Ms. Moore prepared the Note and Deed, your Affiant signed the same .... 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 316) 
Ms. Kirk-Hughes' Af1idavit demonstrates her September 2004 intent to give Balinda 
Antoine (as opposed to Kirk-Scott, Ltd.) a future mortgage or deed of tmst. It then states that 
Golub was informed of a request to prepare a Deed of Tmst to Kirk-Scott in November 2004. 
Finally, it evidences that after the document was prepared, it was executed by Ms. Kirk-Hughes. 
Ultimately, the af1idavits submitted to contradict Golub's testimony only provide 
evidence that Golub had knowledge of a desire or intent to encumber the property; they provide 
no evidence that he had knowledge that such an encumbrance actually attached to any of the 
subject properties. 
As between a mortgagee and another claimant, one who has actual notice of the 
other's prior claim or lien generally takes subject to it, even though the prior claim 
or lien is unrecorded. 
In order to have this effect, the notice or knowledge must be acquired prior to the 
attaching of the rights of the party to be affected by it. Actual notice of a 
mortgage is express, direct information. Notice does not mean a formal written 
warning served on a party. Instead, it means actual knowledge of the fact in 
question, regardless of how it was acquired. However, it must be knowledge of 
the actual existence of the prior conveyance or encumbrance and not merely 
information of a purpose or agreement on the part of the grantor to make or 
give it. 
59 C.l.S. Mortgages §298 (emphasis added). 
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Construing the priority of interests under I.e. §55-612, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
similarly held that knowledge of an intent to create or acquire an interest in property is not a 
legally recognizable interest that would constitute an adverse claim for purposes of defeating the 
status as a bona fide purchaser. In Sun Valley Hot ,)prings Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 
661 (1998), the Court explained this concept as follows: 
In discussing whether a party had actual or constructive notice in regards to 
determining its bona fide purchaser status, this Court in Bear Island Water Ass'n. 
Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 874 P.2d 528 (1994), concluded that a party's prior 
notice of another party's use of a well did not create a real property right in the 
party using the well. A purchaser's prior notice of another party's use of property 
does not create any real property right in the using party that would serve as an 
adverse claim that could defeat the purchaser's status as a bona fide purchaser. Id. 
at 725-26, 874 P.2d at 536-37. Where notice of another party's "use" of property 
does not create a property right in the using party, it follows that notice of another 
party's "intent" to use property in the future would not create a property right in 
that party. 
Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 131 Idaho at 661. 
In a recent decision addressing the same issue presented here, the Court in insight. LLC v. 
Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 302 P.3d 1052 (2013), rejected evidence similar to that proffered by 
Defendants, holding: 
It is not technically possible for 1M to have notice of an encumbrance on property 
before that encumbrance actually comes into existence. Though 1M knew that 
Summitt was intending to execute a deed of trust, that was notice of an intent to 
subsequently encumber property, not notice of an actual encumbrance on 
property. Therefore, the district court's finding that 1M had notice of the Gunters' 
deed of trust is clearly erroneous. 
Insight, 154 Idaho at 783-84. 
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Here, the Kirk-Hughes Defendants have not provided any evidence to contradict Golub's 
testimony that he had no knowledge of Kirk-Scott's encumbrance prior to re-recording his 
Judgment in October 2010. As a result, the trial court did not err in ruling that Golub's Judgment 
lien was valid and had priority under I.C §55-606. 
C. The recordation of Kirk-Scott's deed of trust while the bankruptcy stay was in place 
and with an improper acknOWledgement could not provide constructive notice. 
The Kirk-Hughes Defendants apparently concede the acknowledgement on the deed of 
trust filed on September 17, 2010 was defective, and the recording during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy was void. The Kirk-Hughes defendants apparently agree that these defects preclude 
constructive knowledge of the recordation, but argue that Golub's "actual knowledge" renders the 
defects immaterial. However, as outlined above, Golub did not have actual knowledge, and thus 
to the extent the Kirk-Hughes defendants have to establish constructive knowledge by the 
recording, they cannot do so. As a result, Golub's judgment is prior to the defective recording of 
the six-year old Deed of Trust. 
D. A sanctions order is an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion and no basis 
exists for reversal. 
The Kirk-Hughes Defendants joined in Kirk-Scott's motion to alter or amend the 2013 
judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a), which was in reality a motion to reconsider the court's 
ruling on the Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the 2007 judgment, and prohibited by 
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). The Kirk-Hughes Defendants' appeal on the sanctions order is not based on 
any assertion that the Rule 59 motion was appropriate, but is instead based on the fact that while 
they joined the motion, the Kirk-Hughes Defendants did not file additional pleadings or advance 
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any arguments in support of the motion. As a result. they argue the order for sanctions issued by 
the court based upon an apportionment of the fees incurred in responding to the motion between 
the two moving parties is incorrect. 
However, l.R.C.P. 1 1 (a)(1) is clear that the signature of an attorney on a pleading is the 
conduct that subjects the party to sanctions if the pleading is not grounded in appropriate facts 
and law. It is undisputed that the Kirk-Hughes Defendants were a moving party and "signed" the 
pleading by joining the motion, thereby relying on the Kirk-Scott pleadings. Once the court 
determined that the motion had no basis in law or fact, it had the discretion to award "sanctions," 
which "may" include the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the improper filing. 
I.R.C.P. II(a)(1). The rule itself does not limit the sanction to a moving party that files briefing, 
but is based instead on the submission of an improper pleading. 
It is undisputed that the Kirk-Hughes defendants joined the motion and thus are subject to 
the same sanction for the improper conduct; the court properly exercised its discretion in simply 
splitting the amount of the sanction between the moving parties. See Campbell v. Kildew, 141 
Idaho 640, 65 L 115 P.3d 731 (2005) (the amount of sanctions is committed to the "sound 
discretion" of the court, and attorney fees incurred by the aggrieved party can serve as a "guide" 
to the amount of the award). There is no law that limits the trial court's discretion in the award of 
sanctions to an amount actually incurred by a party in responding to briefing. The trial court's 
order on sanctions was a reasonable determination when both parties propound an Improper 
motion. and no basis exists to reverse the award. 
-14-
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment in favor of the Golubs on the priority 




of April, 2014. 
J/1 
MICHAELT. HOWARD 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS 
Attorneys for PlaintitTs 
-1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 16th day of April, 2014, caused a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPO~DENT' S BRIEF postage prepaid to the following parties: 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell & Bissell, PLLC 
Corbet Aspray House 
820 W. 7th Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99204 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants, Kirk-Hughes 
Development, LLC, Kirk-Hughes & Associates, Inc., 
Geraldine Kirk-Hughes, and Peter Sampson 
Matthew Z. Crotty 
Crotty & Son Law Firm, PLLC 
421 W. Riverside Ave., Suite 1005 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Kirk-Scott, Ltd. 
Ryan M. Best 
Best Law, PLLC 
421 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1005 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Douglas S. Marfice 
Ramsden & Lyons 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816 
VIA REGULAR MAIL 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
~ o o 
BY FACSIMILE 0 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 0 
VIA REGULAR MAIL 




BY FACSIMILE 0 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 0 
VIA REGULAR MAIL 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
~ o o 
BY FACSIMILE 0 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS D 
VIA REGULAR MAIL 





BY FACSIMILE D 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS D 
PATRICK J. CRON1~ 
16-
